

K O R E A

Peking Opens New BW Barrage: Despite earlier indications that Communist propaganda might not devote extensive attention to the United Nations' consideration of bacterial warfare denials submitted by the United States, Peking initiates what promises to become a new BW campaign with the 11 November announcement of further evidence of American germ warfare in the form of "depositions" by an additional 19 captured U.S. airmen. Widespread broadcasting of the new confessions is being accompanied by vehement supporting propaganda which largely reviews past evidence, reiterates old accusations on the plans and purposes of the U.S. action, and asserts that these new revelations represent further irrefutable proof against current American denials. Proportionately equal attention--roughly eight percent of total broadcast volume--is given to the revived BW material in Peking's Home and International Services, in contrast to past peaks in the BW campaign when the subject often received more than twice the attention in the International Service than it did in broadcasts to the home audience (e.g., the confessions of Schwable and Bley).

Of 85 broadcast items devoted to BW during the second week of this period, 35 consist of the verbatim or summarized "depositions" of the captured airmen, with those of Colonels Evans and Mahurin most prominent (14 and 9 broadcasts, respectively). The supporting comment underscores the "planning of germ warfare at the highest level" in the United States, as certified by "men in the know," and the PEOPLE'S DAILY emphasizes that "no denial of the Americans can wash off their crime of germ warfare in the face of iron-clad facts." It is asserted that the United States "began large-scale research into the methods of waging germ warfare as far back as 1941," and the comment implies throughout that, apart from immediate military objectives in the fighting which the Americans wished to attain through bacterial warfare, U.S. military leaders considered the Korean battlefield a convenient testing ground for this type of warfare.

Pyongyang also gives heavy play to the new confessions, and a MINJU CHOSEN editorial contrasts America's "sly scheme" of germ warfare denial in the U.N. with the Soviet Union's earlier demand for an "objective" investigation of the facts.

Obstruction of Repatriation Threatens the Armistice: Detailed accounts of U.S. obstructionism in the prisoner repatriation procedure, and of Chiang-Rhee "agent" terrorism in the POW compounds are accompanied by elaborate justifications for an extension of the explanation period. It is emphasized that to date the Korean-Chinese side was able to conduct less than 50 hours of explanation work, and a press statement issued by Ambassador Allen in New Delhi--following his return from Korea--is described as an example of desperate American efforts to "find reasons for not extending the period of explanations." American opposition to increasing the interview time of individual prisoners is termed "another step in the U.S. plan to disrupt explanations and force the entire program to a standstill," and a 14 November NCNA dispatch scores American reports of the program's "break-down" as a "conspiracy" to reintroduce the "illegal" one-sided screening of prisoners. Recalling that U.S. insistence on this method "had blocked the armistice in Korea for more than a year," the commentary warns that "this tearing up of the terms of reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission is fraught with serious consequences for the armistice."

Panmunjom Agreement Is Based On Communist Proposals: The implied threat that U.S. actions and attitudes peril the armistice is, however, not echoed in comment on the pre-conference talks. There is continued insistence that the composition of the political conference is the paramount question that must be settled at Panmunjom, and Peking's discussions seem to leave no way open for the Communists to retreat from this propaganda commitment. However, the repeated demand for the participation of neutrals no longer stresses the identity of the neutral nations--with the exception of India--and Peking has not repeated the Soviet affirmation, contained in Moscow's 3 November note to the Western Powers, that the USSR could participate in the political conference only as a neutral. While vehement denunciation of U.S. duplicity is reiterated, and with the suppression of the political conference said to be America's real aim, a note of expectancy is sounded in a 4 November NCNA report which asserts that only a "handful of American sabre-rattlers" are still holding out against the participation of neutrals. On the other hand, personal criticism of Ambassador Dean as a "slick American salesman...Dulles' old partner in the big-business law firm" seems designed to bolster the picture of U.S. untrustworthiness and lack of principles in the Korean negotiations.

The agreement reached at Panmunjom on the agenda and procedure of discussions for the political conference is described in a joint Chinese-Korean communique, transmitted by NCNA on 14 November, as "based on the proposal put forward by the Korean-Chinese side at the 11 November meeting of advisers." Acceptance of the "slight revision" proposed by the U.N. side is noted with the reservation that the "so-called scope of authority" of the negotiators is not to be invoked as a "pretext...to limit the solution of questions."

India Is Subjected to "International McCarthyism": In contrast to Peking's guarded criticism three weeks ago of the Indian Command's lack of initiative in curbing terrorism in the POW compounds, there is renewed propaganda support of Indian leadership, exemplified by PEOPLE'S DAILY calling the Indian Command's investigation of prisoner-compound brutalities "an initial but telling blow" against the rule of U.S.-directed Chiang-Rhee "agents." As if to emphasize the "neutrality" of the Indian Custodial Force, Peking features the latest Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission reports on isolated instances of alleged prisoner contact violations by the U.N. side, and the comment underscores the difference between the positive action taken by the Indians and the obstructionist stand of the Swiss and Swedish delegates on the NNRC. In an apparent effort to encourage further action by the Indian Command, Peking also echoes the statements of Polish and Czech NNRC members, who declare that positive action and, if necessary, force must be used to carry out the Commission's commitments under the terms of reference approved under the armistice.

Apparently concerned with preserving Indian support of the repatriation effort--possibly beyond the 22 January deadline which the Communists want to have extended--Peking now charges that India has become the subject of an American propaganda and coercion campaign designed to make India abandon its neutral role. A 16 November commentary by NCNA's special war correspondent Kiang Nan asserts that U.S. pressure is being applied against India in a spirit of "international McCarthyism,"\* with the aim of converting

\* This is apparently the first time that the term "international McCarthyism" has been used in either Moscow or Peking broadcasts.

India from a real neutral into an abettor of America's aggressive policy. With reference to the Korean armistice, America's aim is said to be the continued obstruction of the political conference, while in the broader international sphere India is to be turned into an "instrument of the U.S. aggressive war policy." INS correspondent Hymoff is cited on reported American plans to have India attend the Korean political conference "as a U.S.-chosen neutral nation," and it is recalled that "not long ago" the United States insisted that India could participate only as a neutral nation chosen by the Communist side. The changed American position is said to be a specific attempt to "get India as a neutral nation to stand on the U.S. side." The commentary's emphasis that such a position suits American plans to upset the Korean armistice, along with the stress on the Communists' "respect for neutral nations" implies an actual Communist fear that American endorsement of India as a Political Conference participant may predispose India more favorably toward the U.N. position. Consequently, this propaganda line may be primarily designed to directly support Communist activities later, at the projected Political Conference. The clearly favorable treatment of the Indians at this time may well be aimed at prejudicing them to a favorable view of Communist arguments at the Conference, while the attack on American attempts to influence India from its true "neutral" role could prepare the groundwork for later Communist disavowal of Indian proposals on the grounds that India had succumbed to U.S. pressures and had become an "American neutral."

U.S. Refuses to Recognize Real Neutrality: Peking's unprecedented concern with Indian neutrality, and the broader implications of the commentary's statements not directly related to the Korean armistice assume specific relevance in the context of East-West relations in view of Moscow's current denunciation of American attempts to "undertake the diplomatic conquest" of India. A PRAVDA article broadcast on 13 November to the Soviet home audience and to Southeast Asian listeners charged that "U.S. ruling circles continue stubbornly to intervene in the domestic affairs of India and other Asian countries, and openly express their discontent every time the foreign policy of these countries is in discord with Washington's interests." PRAVDA's criticism of American opposition to "India's neutralist role in international affairs" is echoed in Kiang Nan's declaration that "Dulles and the American propaganda machine have thrown their full weight into a most vicious attack against, and derision of India... with the aim of forcing India out of her neutral role." His assertion that "U.S. lecturing of India shows that the United States... thinks that there are no real neutral nations" is in keeping with a 13 November NEW TIMES article by Boris Leontyev, charging that the United States uses the word "neutralism" derisively in order to stifle opposition to America's aggressive policy.

Joint Chinese-Korean Action Against Resumption of War: Comment on Sino-Korean relations is focused on the current visit of the North Korean Government delegation, headed by Kim Il-Sung, to Peking. Although the delegation includes prominent economic specialists, most of the comment avoids emphasis on economic aid, discussing cooperation in more general terms, and tends to emphasize military comradeship. The theme of "militant friendship" between the two countries, voiced by Kim in his arrival speech, is echoed

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by the PEOPLE'S DAILY and by Pyongyang's NODONG SINMUN, while Chou En-lai underscored continued joint vigilance against American aggression, noting, in particular the "situation of partition and internal antagonism" existing in Korea. Kim Il Sung also paid tribute to the Chinese People's Volunteers for having "protected the northern half of our republic from aggression by the enemy...and forced him to sign the armistice agreement," and the NODONG SINMUN lauds the "tremendous assistance" given by the Chinese people, and praises the "noble exploits" of the CPV. Chou promises that the Chinese people will "continue to carry out the movement of resisting American aggression and aiding Korea...closely guarding against the resumption of the aggressive war." He notes the "enormous friendly assistance" given Korea by the Soviet Union, and asserts that Kim's present visit to Peking, "shortly after his visit to the Soviet Union," will "undoubtedly further strengthen and develop the unbreakable friendship between the great peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of China and Korea."

There is no further elaboration of this three-way friendship theme, and references to mutual aid are made only in non-specific terms. PEOPLE'S DAILY reaffirms the long-term future partnership of People's China and North Korea, with the declaration that "the destiny of the Chinese people is closely tied to that of the Korean people." China is to continue helping the Korean people in "healing their war wounds, restoring their peaceful economy, improving their life, and in striving for peace, democracy, and for the independence and unification of their Fatherland." It is noteworthy that the comment as well as the speeches omit the affirmation, made by both Peking and Pyongyang as late as the recent anniversary of Chinese intervention, that "the solution of the Korean problem is primarily the task of the Korean people themselves." In contrast, the "historic friendship and unity" of China and Korea is emphasized; Kim Il Sung points to the "historical common destiny of the people of Korea and China...separated only by a river," and Chou En-lai underscores that "in history, particularly in the last half-century, the Chinese and Korean peoples have always been bound together, in weal and in woe, in life and in death."

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